Thailand is walking a diplomatic tightrope as it seeks to facilitate efforts to address the Myanmar crisis. On July 12-13, Thailand hosted informal Asean meetings in Bangkok and Pattaya, bringing together Asean foreign ministers, Myanmar's foreign minister, the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and six ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).
Although the NSPNC and EAOs did not meet directly, Thailand offered to facilitate future dialogue. Speaking to the Bangkok Post, experts questioned whether Myanmar truly trusts Thailand and examined the implications for regional politics. The complex conflict has left Thailand in a difficult but potentially indispensable mediating role.
The 'necessary trust'
Independent security and foreign affairs analyst Panitan Wattanayagorn said Thailand's role as a facilitator is the result of Myanmar's trust in the foundation of Thai-Myanmar bilateral relations, which is based on necessity rather than the usual amity of friendship.
He said Thailand relies on Myanmar for labour and energy, particularly natural gas, which has largely kept Thailand's power sector running.
Border security issues, including transnational crime, drug trafficking, scam operations and relations with ethnic armed groups, have also featured prominently in bilateral ties.
"It is a deeply and mutually interdependent relationship," he said.
Thailand and Myanmar can also be seen as "frenemies" -- part ally, part adversary, Mr Panitan said.
Historically, military-to-military relations between the countries have been close, particularly after the 2014 coup led by Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha. Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing once described himself as the adopted son of the late Privy Council president Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, Mr Panitan said.
However, this closeness has faded under the current Thai administration. Mr Panitan said Min Aung Hlaing has become wary of Thai political factions and dissatisfied that Thailand has not formally recognised his government.
Min Aung Hlaing was sworn in as president following tightly controlled elections in April 2026.
Nevertheless, Mr Panitan said the meeting in Pattaya facilitated by veteran diplomat Sihasak Phuangketkeow could be viewed as Thailand's attempt to create space for dialogue among relevant stakeholders.
He added the meeting was also intended to show Thailand had not distanced itself entirely from Myanmar's current government.
"We are trying to maintain a balance, but it's a complex relationship involving humanitarian corridors and managing armed groups that the Myanmar authorities want us to suppress, such as the Wa or the Karen," he said.
Anekchai Rueangrattanakorn, an adjunct lecturer in political science at Silpakorn University, said Thailand's role as facilitator reflected Myanmar's trust for several reasons.
Thailand has adopted an inclusive and soft diplomacy approach, sometimes using back-channel engagement, when dealing with Myanmar, unlike some Asean members that have taken a harder line, particularly in light of the humanitarian crisis there.
This approach has also helped build trust with the Myanmar junta, he said.
Moreover, with a shared border of more than 2,400 kilometres, Thailand has been confronted with issues involving refugees and transnational crime, which intensified after the 2021 coup. As a result, the country has little choice but to engage with Myanmar to manage the spillover effects.
"Although the Five-Point Consensus was agreed upon five years ago, it has yet to produce substantive progress, and Thailand cannot afford to wait for this regional mechanism to deliver results. Therefore, Thailand needs to use informal channels to resolve the problem," he said.
"To put it simply, the junta engages with Thailand based on pragmatic trust and mutual interests. EAOs engage with Thailand because of geopolitical necessity. Thus, Thailand is an indispensable actor in the equation."
Facilitator's role
Although Thailand has sought to play the role of facilitator and maintain a balanced position among the various stakeholders in the Myanmar crisis, it has faced criticism that engagement with Myanmar's current military government could legitimise the junta.
Mr Panitan said Thailand has initiated "Track 1.5 diplomacy" -- an informal channel of engagement that allows Myanmar to interact with Asean and other stakeholders.
The initiative has drawn criticism from some Asean member states, which fear such engagement could legitimise the military regime. Thailand has also been accused of undermining Asean consensus. However, Thailand has maintained that the bloc's official approach has failed to produce meaningful progress and that informal engagement is necessary to move the process forward.
Other countries have participated in Track 1.5 diplomacy, he said, noting that China and India joined an informal meeting in Thailand in June 2023 because both have also been affected by the crisis in Myanmar.
Mr Anekchai said Thailand's adoption of this approach has made it an important bridge between Myanmar's government and Asean.
"Thailand positions itself as a supporter of Asean mechanisms, gaining recognition as a healer of rifts rather than a divider. Geography has also forced Thailand to deal with the crisis directly, but its diplomatic strategy is turning that necessity into a prominent role on the international stage," he said.
To avoid legitimising the junta, Thailand must expand its dialogue to include the National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar's government-in-exile, and EAOs, he said.
Thailand should also focus on humanitarian assistance by increasing cooperation with civil society organisations to reduce accusations that it is legitimising the junta.
Maintaining neutrality
Mr Anekchai said that while Thailand has taken an active role in facilitating dialogue on Myanmar, one of its biggest challenges is maintaining the perception of neutrality.
He warned that Thailand could be viewed as biased if it becomes too closely engaged with any single stakeholder, particularly Myanmar's military government. To avoid this, he said, Thailand must carefully balance its engagement with all parties and employ multiple diplomatic channels.
He suggested Thailand use formal diplomatic channels to engage with the State Administration Council (SAC) only on issues directly related to Thai national interests, such as cross-border crime, transboundary haze and labour management.
At the same time, members of parliament, academics and private development organisations could serve as intermediaries in opening dialogue with the NUG and EAOs. These channels would provide opportunities to better understand their concerns, aspirations and political visions.
Furthermore, he argued the military's role in facilitating dialogue should be limited, with greater responsibility given to civil society organisations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such an approach, he said, would help build trust with Myanmar's pro-democracy movement and encourage broader participation in the dialogue process.
Thailand should establish "safe zones" for civilians in coordination with both the SAC and EAOs, he said. In addition, Thailand should acknowledge the de facto authority exercised by EAOs in certain areas and engage them as local administrators on issues such as border trade and infrastructure, while discussing human rights and Myanmar's future political transition with the NUG.
Mr Panitan said Thailand must also recognise the changing political realities in Myanmar.
He argued that the NUG's political momentum is fading and that although Aung San Suu Kyi remains widely respected among the Myanmar people, her political influence has changed.
Meanwhile, the People's Defence Force remains reluctant to negotiate, but its military momentum has peaked and is now being contained, he said. At the same time, the SAC has maintained its position and is moving ahead with plans for elections.
"If Thailand recognises these shifts, we can bring everyone to the table," he said.
