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Reason
Reason
Politics
Eugene Volokh

THE TRUTH ABOUT: Eleventh circuit panel strikes down by 2 1 vote stop florida university professor speech restrictions | History Defined

Some excerpts from today's very long opinion in Pernell v. Fla. Bd. of Governors of State Univ. by Judge Britt Grant, joined by Judge Charles Wilson; note that the leading Eleventh Circuit precedent on this is Bishop v. Aronov, which both opinions discuss in considerable detail:

[A.] The provision at issue here disallows any "training or instruction that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels" students at Florida's public colleges and universities to believe any of eight concepts relating to topics like race and sex:

  1. Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex are morally superior to members of another race, color, national origin, or sex.
  2. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously.
  3. A person's moral character or status as either privileged or oppressed is necessarily determined by his or her race, color, national origin, or sex.
  4. Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex cannot and should not attempt to treat others without respect to race, color, national origin, or sex.
  5. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, bears responsibility for, or should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment because of, actions committed in the past by other members of the same race, color, national origin, or sex.
  6. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment to achieve diversity, equity, or inclusion.
  7. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, bears personal responsibility for and must feel guilt, anguish, or other forms of psychological distress because of actions, in which the person played no part, committed in the past by other members of the same race, color, national origin, or sex.
  8. Such virtues as merit, excellence, hard work, fairness, neutrality, objectivity, and racial colorblindness are racist or sexist, or were created by members of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex to oppress members of another race, color, national origin, or sex.

Though "promot[ing]" any of these concepts is barred, criticizing them is not. Beyond that, the Act allows instructors to introduce the ideas in a neutral fashion, permitting discussion "as part of a larger course"—so long as "instruction is given in an objective manner without endorsement of the concepts." And the law does not say how far past the classroom its restrictions extend—off-campus speeches and other settings may be in play….

{The Act's terms apply to all public schools, starting with kindergarten and going through graduate school, but the plaintiffs challenge only its application to postsecondary schools.}

[B.] [The defendants argue] that because Florida "appropriates public funds" to support public education at the State's universities, it is "entitled to say what it wishes" at those universities [under the government speech doctrine]. That is a sweeping assertion, and one that is unsupported by the cited government speech precedents.

Those cases are about public monuments, license plates, and the like—not anything close to academic teaching. The thrust of their holdings is that when the government speaks it can choose its message. There is no need, as the Supreme Court put it, for a local government that supports recycling to include a counterargument from the local trash company. The classic government speech cases Florida leans on are also about the government itself expressing certain ideas—not banning employees from endorsing others. Even so, the State asserts that "if the speech of private individuals proposing license plate slogans is government speech, then surely the classroom speech of state-employed educators at state universities is too." But why? Florida does not say….

{Of course[,] universities have control over their own curriculums…. They need not offer, for instance, every class a student would like to take. But that does not resolve, or really even address, the issues in this case.}

A variety of factors are at play when considering whether the government is speaking …. Several considerations may be relevant, including "whether the government maintains control over the speech," "whether the type of speech has traditionally communicated government messages," and "whether the public would reasonably believe that the government has endorsed the speech."

We first consider whether the government maintains control over the speech here. The State has traditionally exercised relatively little control over postsecondary education, especially as compared to public primary or secondary education. Florida imposes few curricular requirements by statute. And those that it does impose involve basic general education requirements—things like how many core classes students must take to graduate and what standards a communications course must meet. (Such a course "must afford students the ability to communicate effectively.")

And the "purpose and mission" of Florida's postsecondary educational system, as defined by state law, is to "enable[] all students to participate in the search for knowledge and individual development," to "discover and disseminate knowledge," to "foster[] diversity of educational opportunity," and to "develop in students heightened intellectual, cultural, and humane sensitivities." These broad ambitions are inconsistent with unrestricted control over the messages conveyed by university professors.

The relative independence of Florida's universities diverges from the State's near plenary authority over primary and secondary education, where "state academic standards establish the core content of the curricula to be taught in the state." In exercising this broad authority, the State Board of Education has adopted a comprehensive list of educational standards—nearing 7,300 in number and spanning every subject and every grade. To meet these standards, moreover, public school teachers must "us[e] the books and materials required," "follow[] the prescribed courses of study," and only "employ[] approved methods of instruction." The state government, in short, has traditionally controlled the curriculum in primary and secondary schools, but offers only minimal statutory guidance in the postsecondary education context.

The State's relative detachment from college lectures is even more revealing when compared to the level of state control we see in the government speech context—nearly total. A few examples illustrate the point. In one case about the use of a stadium loudspeaker during a state championship game, this Court explained that the announcer's remarks were "entirely scripted," with "[e]very word" written by a state employee. And in another involving a USDA-sponsored pro-beef campaign, the Supreme Court noted that the government exercised "final approval authority over every word used." Florida does not—and could not—exercise that kind of control over every postsecondary class lecture. Indeed, Florida does not argue that it has controlled every word that university professors say, only that it can.

And common sense also has a role to play here. Does anyone really think that every professor in every class at every public university is putting forward the official line of the State's political branches? So while the government speech doctrine "does not require omnipotence," Florida has not come close to exhibiting the degree of control necessary to classify professors' lectures as government speech.

The second and third factors—whether the speech has traditionally communicated government messages and whether the public would view the speech as endorsed by the government—are closely related here. Certainly at some level the public perceives a seal of approval from the State for the curricular decisions of its universities. And courts have recognized that the universities themselves at least have control over "the parameters of focus and general subject matter of curriculum."

But the text of this law does not seek to develop the curriculum of a university, of a major, or even of a class. Instead, it seeks to bar disfavored speech on one set of topics at every university and in any class. And it does so in a way that contradicts Florida's longstanding (and presumably still valid) statutes governing its universities.

Florida law, for instance, requires state universities to continually assess "the intellectual freedom and viewpoint diversity" and "the extent to which competing ideas and perspectives are presented" at the school. And the Board of Governors is forbidden from limiting students' "access to, or observation of, ideas and opinions that they may find uncomfortable, unwelcome, disagreeable, or offensive," if that speech is protected by the First Amendment.

These principles are consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that the "classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.'" And they are inconsistent with the idea that university professors communicate government messages as mouthpieces of the state. These statutes (together with common sense) make clear that the public—and even the State—both recognize that university professors speak independently and without government endorsement of every idea they communicate….

[Moreover, the Supreme Court's leading government employee speech cases] centered on disciplining a single employee who had already spoken—"a post hoc analysis of one employee's speech and its impact on that employee's public responsibilities." United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union (1995). Here, the government's attempt to control employee speech is at the other end of the spectrum. The Act is a wide-ranging, ex ante restriction on the speech of every public university professor in the state. Because the Act "chills potential speech before it happens," the State's "burden is greater with respect to this statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action." …

[C.] [W]e are still left with a difficult question: can the Individual Freedom Act's speech restrictions be constitutionally applied to these professors? After all, though it offers little direct control, Florida (like other states) is fundamentally in charge of its public universities, appointing most members of the Board of Governors, providing considerable funding, and establishing certain core curricular standards.

"Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators." And because "States historically have been sovereign" in the field of education, the "traditional role in the formulation and execution of educational policy" belongs to them—not us. That leaves federal courts "reluctan[t] to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions." But these precedents, like their counterparts reserving space in the First Amendment catalogue for academic freedom, fail to provide a direct answer to the question we consider today.

We … [turn] to Bishop v. Aronov (11th Cir. 1991), which asked as we do here, "to what degree a school may control classroom instruction before touching the First Amendment rights of a teacher." … [T]hat case arose when the University of Alabama barred one of its professors from using class time to describe his religious views. Some of his comments concerned his belief in "the creative force behind human physiology." Others were made to share his faith, be open about his biases, and offer suggestions for students on how to deal with academic stress. But the students sought something else—an uninterrupted course on exercise physiology. After enough complaints, the University directed Bishop to stop, forbidding him from "presenting his religious viewpoint during instructional time, even to the extent that it represent[ed] his professional opinion about his subject matter." We ultimately rejected the professor's free speech challenge to that restriction.

Here, Florida suggests that a direct line connects the constitutionality of the University's response to Bishop with the constitutionality of the Florida political branches' prophylactic speech ban on all public college and university professors. Not so. Bishop itself instructs that there is "no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry into whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech." …

[F]ollowing Bishop's lead, we recognize "the 'basic educational mission'" of the university system, which authorizes "the use of 'reasonable restrictions' over in-class speech that [the State] could not censor outside the classroom." Along those same lines, we recognize Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier's holding (endorsed in Bishop) that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student or professor speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."

These factors cash out to the recognition that here, as in other First Amendment cases, we are called to balance the professors' interests against the State's. But the government's interests in this equation are rather circumscribed: editorial control is taken for granted, but restrictions must be reasonable and related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. In conducting this analysis, we consider Bishop's three general factors: the context of the speech; the state's "position as a public employer"; and the "strong predilection for academic freedom as an adjunct of the free speech rights of the First Amendment."

First, context. Here the context is the same as in Bishop: "the university classroom during specific in-class time." Bishop also noted that the "University's interest is most obvious when student complaints suggest apparent coercion—even when not intended by the professor." The word coercion, to be sure, has echoes of Establishment Clause precedents (particularly around the time of Bishop), but we think that concern is relevant here, too.

Florida's restrictions are, as the State admits, an attempt to force uniformity of thought on students by curtailing the free exchange of ideas in universities—the very environments traditionally regarded as laboratories for expression and truth seeking. Compelling certain beliefs by suppressing "individual thought and expression" is "especially" dangerous in the classroom context, "where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition." Unlike in Bishop, where the University was furthering an anti-coercion goal, Florida here asserts the opposite interest—coercing university faculty (and by extension the students) into avoiding a certain set of ideas. Whether Florida is right or wrong about how dangerous these viewpoints are is irrelevant, at least to our inquiry as a court. "No matter how controversial the ideas, allowing the government to set the terms of the debate is poison, not antidote."

Second, we consider the State's interests as an employer. "Courts agree that the school's administration may at least establish the parameters of focus and general subject matter of curriculum." No doubt. And "[t]angential to the authority over its curriculum, there lies some authority over the conduct of teachers in and out of the classroom that significantly bears on the curriculum or that gives the appearance of endorsement by the university." This recognition, we think, significantly mitigates the risk that enforcing the First Amendment in the academic context would leave universities or other government authorities powerless to set overall curricular decisions or exclude speech that veers outside of well-understood parameters—personal tangents irrelevant to the subject matter, conspiracy theories, and the like.

Our own early cases support this same point. In one, we found no constitutional error when a university fired a professor whose speech "seriously impair[ed] … his effectiveness as an instructor." Ferguson v. Thomas (5th Cir. 1970). In another, we rejected a First Amendment challenge to a university's decision to deny tenure when the professor gave students two course credits for effectively taking only one course; awarded most students high grades for little work; made "untrue and misleading public statements"; and demonstrated a lack of "professionalism and maturity." Megill v. Bd. of Regents (5th Cir. 1976). And in Bishop, we again found no First Amendment violation when the university determined that a professor's tangential speech impeded his ability to properly teach physiology. These cases show that even when reserving space for academic freedom, university administrators (and perhaps other government officials too) have a legitimate interest in ensuring that a professor's in-class speech is both "germane" to the curriculum and "professionally competent."

Florida's justifications are not in line with those rationales. Rather than asserting an interest in promoting classroom efficiency or appropriately educating students, Florida says its "sovereign judgment" is that the forbidden viewpoints are "contrary to the State's most cherished ideals." But advancing cherished state ideals is a far cry from ordinary workplace management concerns, much less a legitimate pedagogical interest. What's more, even if many of these ideas are dead wrong, they are not at all irrelevant, at least in certain coursework. Florida itself seems to recognize this fact by allowing discussion of the viewpoints, even while barring their endorsement.

The State does assert one other justification for its law—an "interest in preventing invidious racial discrimination in public education." But as we have already held when considering the companion provision limiting private employers' speech, the Act does no such thing. Discrimination "generally means to treat differently," and "the Act does not regulate differential treatment"—it restricts speech that State political authorities find objectionable.

Preventing professors from positively discussing a viewpoint is not the same as regulating discrimination, which the State can certainly do. A professor who espouses a particular idea does not stand in the same shoes as one who ridicules a student, threatens a student, or targets a student. The Act does not limit (and does not purport to limit) actual discrimination of any kind. It instead assumes that mere exposure to what the State views as the wrong viewpoint is itself a serious harm. But a difference of opinion is not discrimination….

Third, we consider what we called in Bishop the "strong predilection for academic freedom." As we noted there (and here), scholarly freedom is "abundant[ly]" celebrated in First Amendment caselaw, and the "vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." Indeed, our "Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection."

Again, Bishop proves the point. True, that court also noted that "pronouncements about academic freedom" in other contexts "cannot be extrapolated to deny schools command of their own courses." To that end, we nod our heads along with Bishop as it recognizes that "academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself." Florida's Act, in contrast, removes any decisionmaking by the academy about the topics it bars. And the State's rationale is not limited—it would allow the legislature to block any speech on any topic for any reason….

The broader the restriction, and the more people whose speech it limits, the more scrutiny it must receive. Case-by-case restrictions on a single problematic professor's teaching are the bread and butter of First Amendment cases affirming the curricular authority of universities. But Florida tries to stretch those precedents to fit an entirely new context: not a university disciplining one professor for discrete misconduct, but a state government barring all professors from sharing politically disfavored ideas. {Bishop offers no holding about a state's authority to control curriculum; it protects a university's authority to control curriculum.} …

[D.] This Act's effect on academic freedom is compounded by its lack of clear definitions…. For example, when a professor assigns a reading for class that promotes one of the prohibited concepts, is that professor subjecting the student to "instruction that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels such student … to believe" in the concept? What about when a professor hosts a guest speaker who presents only one side of the debate? {The defendants tell us that a professor would not violate the Act by hosting a guest speaker who promotes one of the eight concepts unless that professor endorses the guest's speech. This exacerbates rather than solves the problem, layering imprecision on imprecision.} Or how about a professor who teaches about one of the forbidden concepts using the Socratic method? Would those discussions be "objective"? The parties disagree on every front. And that is to say nothing of the lack of clear language in the individual concepts' definitions. Just to name one, what does "morally superior" encompass, and against whose perspective is it measured? …

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