From an Institute for Free Speech symposium on the 50th anniversary of Buckley, which I'll be cross-posting over the next couple of weeks; this is by John Samples, a former Vice President at the Cato Institute and currently a Member of Meta's Oversight Board:
In the late 1960s, the U.S. Congress began enacting campaign finance regulations. The reasons for those regulations are not hard to discern. In 1968, Eugene McCarthy, an anti-war challenger supported by a small number of large donors, effectively drove Lyndon Johnson from the presidency; a populist from the right did well, though short of securing the Democratic nomination. Richard Nixon narrowly defeated Hubert Humphrey by raising and spending what seemed to be, at the time, huge sums of money.
By limiting spending on campaigns, Congress sought to restrict competition and protect the political status quo. Spending limits would make it difficult to spend enough money to effectively challenge congressional incumbents. The equality of spending implicit in the presidential public financing scheme headed off a growing Republican advantage in presidential fundraising. And contribution limits further complicated challenging the status quo by making it harder to raise money.
Buckley v. Valeo considered how far election campaigns could be regulated and restrained under the First Amendment. As we know, the Buckley Court's answer was mixed: the government interest in preventing corruption or "the appearance of corruption" validated contribution limits. Public education fostered more speech, thereby educating the public. But the Court rejected spending limits as a limit on speech, and equality of spending as a justification for campaign finance regulation. The Court also upheld mandated disclosure of donors and donations.
What were the effects of Buckley? My answers to that question depend on two assumptions.
