It's becoming more obvious every day that they didn't teach "On War" by Carl von Clausewitz at the 401st KGB school in Leningrad when Vladimir Putin was a student in 1975. Right from the start of the invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Putin violated Clausewitz's most famous axiom, that a true strategist should "identify the decisive point and concentrate everything on it, removing forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives."
Putin's invasion was all over the map. He had forces in Belarus, north of Kyiv; in Russia, north of Kharkiv; in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donbas held by separatists; and in Crimea, which he had taken in 2014. He attacked on all four axes at once. The force in Belarus, ostensibly located there for a training exercise, was to be what they call in the army "the tip of the spear" for the attack on Kyiv, some 100 miles from the Belarus border. This military grouping quickly turned into the infamous 40-mile convoy, which was heavily hit by dismounted Ukrainian troops who decimated supply trucks, tanks, armored personnel carriers and fuel trucks with shoulder-fired weapons.
