Until recently, Western states had no real reason to sail warships through the Russian Arctic on a freedom of navigation operation (or FONOP) despite calls to do so. This would have made an already risky operation both needless and provocative. But on Dec. 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law a measure designed to restrict navigation by foreign warships in sections of Russia’s Arctic waters. This is just the latest misstep in a year full of them for the Russian president. Instead of limiting activity by foreign warships off Russia’s Arctic coast, the new law could well incite navigation by Western warships close to Russia’s shoreline.
Russia has recently placed greater emphasis on prosperity and security in its Arctic coastal regions in anticipation of the opportunities and challenges created by a rapidly warming Arctic. The Northern Sea Route (NSR), Russia’s name for part of the Northeast Passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via Eurasia’s northern shore, is key to this program. Putin’s vision is for the NSR to become a major corridor for global trade, and Russian leaders have seized on moments like the 2021 blockage of the Suez Canal to promote their ambitious tonnage goals. But as Russian leaders recognize, commercial users are not the only ones drawn to the waters north of Russia by warming waters and receding ice. Foreign warships are already showing up.
Some, particularly American, commentators have long called for a FONOP against Russia’s Arctic claims. In the purest sense, a FONOP is an act of deliberate disobedience to defend international law against a state’s excessive claims. In Washington’s case, the FONOP program generally involves warships doing things (from simple navigation to military exercises or surveys) that a coastal state’s laws say are forbidden—a claim of right backed by might. But because the U.S. FONOP program uses warships, a FONOP makes no legal sense if there is no law on the books locally that applies to warships.
